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1. Classical control problem.
x˙ = f (x , u), x ∈ Rn, u ∈ U ⊂ CompR l ,
x(t0) = x0, t ∈ [t0,T ],
H(x(T )) = −ρ(x(T ),M).
C(x0,T − t0) – reachability set.
x¯(t) – optimal trajectory.
Γ(x0,T − t0), Γ(x¯(t),T − t), C(x¯(t),T − t)
R. Bellmann
Time-consistency, Strong Time-consistency.
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2. Multycriterial control.
x˙ = f (x , u), x ∈ Rn, u ∈ U ⊂ CompR l ,
x(t0) = x0, t ∈ [t0,T ],
H(x(T )) = {H1(x(T )), . . . ,Hk(x(T ))}.
Let k = 3, Hi (x(T )) = −ρ(x(T ),Mi ).
Pareto-optimal solution.
x¯(t) – Pareto-optimal trajectory.
Γ(x0,T − t0), Γ(x¯(t),T − t), C(x0,T − t0), C(x¯(t),T − t),
P(x0,T − t0),P(x¯(t),T − t)
TC but not STC
Leon A. Petrosyan 3/16
3. Nash bargaining solution in Differential Games.
x˙ = f (x , u1, . . . , un), x ∈ Rm, ui ∈ Ui ⊂ CompR l ,
x(t0) = x0, t ∈ [t0,T ],
The payoff of player i → Hi (x(T )),
Γ(x0,T − t0)
W (x0,T − t0; {i}) – the garanteed payoff of player i
NB.
max
x′∈C(x0,T−t0)
n∏
i=1
(Hi (x
′)−W (x0,T − t0; {i})) =
n∏
i=1
(Hi (x¯)−W (x0,T − t0; {i}))
x¯(t), x0 → x¯ , Γ(x¯(t),T − t), t ∈ [t0,T − t0], W (x¯(t),T − t; {i})
max
x′∈C(x¯(t),T−t)
n∏
i=1
(Hi (x
′)−W (x¯(t),T−t; {i})) =
n∏
i=1
(Hi (x¯(x¯(t)))−W (x¯(t),T−t; {i}))
x¯(x¯(t)) 6= const 6= x¯
NB, not TC, not STC
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Regularization. Here we consider simple case of the game with terminal payoff
and prescribed duration.
Denote the payoff function as
Ki (x0,T − t0; u1(·), . . . , un(·)) = Hi (x(T )),
where x(t) is the solution of problem
x˙ = f (x , u1, . . . , un) (1)
x(t0) = x0
Denote the corresponding differential game by Γ(x0,T − t0). Consider a
Bargaining Problem for each subgame Γ(y ,T − t), where y ∈ C(x0, t), and
C(x0, t) is the reachability set for system (1). We can have in mind as bargaining
solution Nash Bargaining (NB), (KS). Suppose we define for each y ∈ C(x0, t),
t ∈ [t0,T ] the NB solution and denote it by D(y ,T − t).
D(y ,T − t) = {Hi (x˜(T ; y , t))}
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Suppose x˜(t), t ∈ [t0,T ] is the bargain trajectory in the game Γ(x0,T − t0)
leading from initial point x0 to bargaining point x˜(T ; x0, t0). As we mention the
NB solution as many other bargaing solutions (including Kalai–Smorodinsky) are
time inconsistent, which means that
D(x˜(t),T − t) 6= const t ∈ [t0,T ].
This makes difficult the implementation of NB in practice.
Here we purpose the regularization mechanism similar to IDP we used considering
the similar time-inconsistency problem in differential cooperative games. To look
different from IDP (imputation distribution procedure) we shall call in PDP
(payoff distribution procedure).
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Introduce the function gi (τ), τ ∈ [t0,T ] such that
Di (x0,T − t0) = H(x˜(T ; x0,T − t0)) =
∫ T
t0
gi (τ)dτ.
gi (τ) is a new control variable (τ ∈ [t0,T ]) used to distribute the payoff over
the time interval [t0,T ].
Time-consistency condition
Di (x0,T − t0) =
∫ t
t0
gi (τ)dτ + Di (x˜(τ),T − τ).
If function Di is differentiable we get
gi (t) = − d
dt
Di (x˜(τ),T − t),
or
gi (t) = −
n∑
i=1
∂Di
∂xi
fi (x˜(t), u˜1(t), . . . , u˜n(t)), i = 1, . . . , n.
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Kalai–Smorodinsky solution
x˙ = f (x , u1, . . . , un), x ∈ Rm, ui ∈ U ⊂ CompR l
x(t0) = x0, t ∈ [t0,T ].
The payoff of player i – Hi (x(T ))
Γ(x0,T − t0)
W (x0,T − t0; {i}) – the max guaranteed payoff of player i
KS–solution
Consider the set ℵ(x0,T − t0) of all possible payoffs of players.
ℵ(x0,T − t0) = {H1(x(T )), . . . ,Hn(x(T ))}
for all possible x(T ) ∈ C(x0,T − t0) where C(x0,T − t0) is the reachability set
of (1).
Correspondingly denote by ℵ(y ,T − t), y ∈ C(x0,T − t0) the set of all possible
payoffs of players in subgames starting from y with duration T − t (Γ(y ,T − t)).
Denote by
H i = max
x(T )∈C(x0,T−t0)
H(x(T )).
Consider a line L connecting the "status point" W with H.
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The intersection of L and ℵ(x0,T − t0) is called Kalai–Smorodinsky solution
(KS–solution).
Example. KS–solution is time–inconsistent
x˙ = u1 + u2, |u1| ≤ 1, |u2| ≤ 1, x ∈ R2, u1, u2 ∈ R2
x0 = (6, 3), t ∈ [0, 2], x = (x1, x2)
Hi (x0, 2; u1, u2) = −x(2),K2(z0, 2; u1, u2) = −|y(2)|
Problem Γ(x0, 2)
W (x0, 2) = (−6, 3)
H(x0, 2) = (−2, 0)
and corresponds to the point x̂(x0, 2) = (2, 0), since maxH1 = −2, maxH2 = 0.
C 2(6, 3; 2) is circle with center (6, 3) and radius 4.
Optimal trajectory is to move from x0 = (6, 3) to x̂(x0, 2) = (2, 0) with maximal
velocity till the intersection with C(6, 3; 2). The intersection point is KS–solution
of Γ(x0, 2).
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We see that when moving along KS–solution trajectory x(t) connecting x0 with
KS–solution of the problem Γ(x0, 2) in subgame Γ(x(1), 1) we get a new KS–
solution which do not coincide with previous KS–solution of the game Γ(x0, 2).
KS(x0, 2) 6= KS(x(1), 1).
(time–inconsistency)
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4. Differential Cooperative Game.
Differential Cooperative Game Γ(x0,T−t0) with prescribed duration T−t0 from
the initial position x0.
x˙ = f (x , u1, . . . , un), x ∈ Rn, ui ∈ Ui (1)
integral payoff
Ki (x0,T − t0; u1, . . . , un) =
∫ T
t0
hi (x(t))dt, hi > 0, i = 1, . . . , n.
Cooperative form of Γ(x0,T − t0).
Cooperative behavior u∗(t) = {u∗1 (t), . . . , u∗n (t)}
n∑
i=1
Ki (x0,T − t0; u∗1 , . . . , u∗n ) =
= max
u1,...,un
n∑
i=1
Ki (x0,T − t0; u1, . . . , un) =
=
n∑
i=1
∫ T
t0
hi (x
∗(t))dt = v(N; x0,T − t0),
x∗(t) – cooperative trajectory.
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Characteristic Function in Γ(x0,T − t0).
v(S ; x0,T − t0), S ⊂ N,
superadditivity: v(S1 ∪ S2; x0,T − t0) ≥ v(S1; x0,T − t0) + v(S2; x0,T − t0),
S1 ∩ S2 = ∅.
There are different ways on how to define c. f.
a. Classical: v(S ; x0,T − t0) = ValΓS,N\S(x0,T − t0), where
ΓS,N\S(x0,T − t0) is a zero-sum game played upon the
structure of game Γ(x0,T − t0) between S as player 1 and
N \ S as player 2.
b. v(S ; x0,T − t0) = ∑i∈S Ki (x0,T − t0; u¯S , u¯N\S), where
(u¯S , u¯N\S) is some giver NE in Γ′S,N\S played as non zero-sum
game over the structure of Γ(x0,T − t0) between two players:
coalition S as player 1 and N \ S as player 2
c. v(S ; x0,T − t0) = maxuS={ui ,i∈S}
∑
i∈S Ki (x0,T − t0; u¯||uS),
where u¯ = (u¯1, . . . , u¯n) is some fixed NE in Γ(x0,T − t0).
L. Petrosjan, G. Zaccour Time-consistent Shapley value allocation of
pollution cost reduction // Journal of Economics Dunamics & Control,
27 (2003), pp. 381–398.
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Let E(x0,T − t0) be the imputation set in Γ(x0,T − t0):
E(x0,T−t0) = {ξ = (ξi ) :
n∑
i=1
ξi = v(N; x0,T−t0), ξi ≥ v({i}; x0,T−t0), i ∈ N}.
Denote by C t−t0 (x0), t ∈ [t0,T ] reachable set of the (1).
For each y ∈ C t−t0 (x0) consider a subgame Γ(y ,T−t) of the game Γ(x0,T−t0),
with corresponding c. f. v(S ; y ,T − t) and set of imputations E(y ,T − t).
Definition. A point-to-set mapping C(y ,T − t) ⊂ E(y ,T − t) defined for all
y ∈ C t−t0 (x0), t ∈ [t0,T ] is call solution concept (SC) in the family of subgames
Γ(y ,T − t).
In special cases C(y ,T−t) may be a core, NM-solution, Shapley value, nucleous
etc.
What happens when the game develops along the cooperative trajectory x∗(t)?
We pass through current subgame Γ(x∗(t),T − t), wilingly or not updating the
current SC ↔ C(x∗(t),T − t).
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Imputation Distribution Procedure (IDP).
Let ξ¯ ∈ C(x0,T − t0) and βi (t), i ∈ N, t ∈ [t0,T ] satisfies the condition
ξ¯ =
∫ T
t0
βi (t)dt, i ∈ N, βi ≥ 0.
βi (t) is called IDP.
Define
ξ¯(θ) =
∫ θ
t0
βi (t)dt, i ∈ N, βi ≥ 0.
Definition. The SC C(x∗(t),T − t), t ∈ [t0,T ] is called time-consistent (TC) if
there exist such IDP β(t) = {βi (t)} that
ξ¯ − ξ¯(θ) ∈ C(x∗(θ),T − θ)
for all θ ∈ [t0,T ].
Definition. The SC C(x∗(t),T − t), t ∈ [t0,T ] is called strongly time-consistent
(STC) if there exist such IDP β(t) = {βi (t)} that
ξ¯(θ)⊕ C¯(x∗(θ),T − θ) ⊂ C(x0,T − t0)
for all θ ∈ [t0,T ]. Here ξ¯ ⊕ A means the set of all possible vectors ξ¯ + η for all
η ∈ A.
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Consider C(x∗(t),T − t) along x∗(t), t ∈ [t0,T ]. Suppose we can construct a
differentiable selector ξt ∈ C(x∗(t),T − t), then we can easily get for β(t) the
following formula
ξ¯ = ξ¯(θ) + ξt → ξ¯ =
∫ θ
t0
βi (t)dt + ξ
t
βi (t) = − d
dt
ξt
If ξt can be chosen as monotonic nonincreasing (which is very possible since
hi > 0, then βi ≥ 0, and SC is TC.
If the case (for instance) C(y ,T − t) is a Shapley value, we get
βi (t) = −
∑
S⊂N,S3i
(n − s)!(s − 1)!
n!
[
d
dt
v(x∗(t),T − t; S)−
− d
dt
v(x∗(t),T − t; S \ {i})
]
and we need only differentiability of the value function (c. f.) v(x ,T − t; S).
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